Jun 28 2011

Stricter Recusal Standards Offer Only Part of the Answer

A recent editorial in West Virgina’s The Charleston Gazette implores the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates to consider model recusal standards at its session in August. West Virginia has been at the center of conversations about recusal reform since 2009’s Caperton v. Massey. After a trial decision in favor of Caperton, Massey contributed $3 million to a judicial race that ultimately elected Justice Brent Benjamin to the West Virginia Supreme Court. The Caperton case stirred public skepticism of the court when the case came before the West Virginia Supreme Court and Justice Benjamin refused to recuse himself; the Court then ruled in favor of Massey, twice. Caperton appealed to the US Supreme Court arguing that Massey’s significant financial contributions during the 2004 judicial election was cause for Justice Benjamin’s recusal. The Supreme Court agreed, affirming the need for respect for, and impartiality of, the courts: “We conclude that there is a serious risk of actual bias – based on objective and reasonable perceptions – when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.”


According to the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law School, “Judicial election spending has spiraled out of control in the past decade, with high court candidates raising $206.9 million in 2000-2009, more than double the $83.3 million raised in the 1990s.” While clearer recusal standards will help to avoid corrupt results and hopefully regain the trust of the public, they do not address the root of the problem – that judicial elections, and their reliance on campaign contributions, create a climate of distrust. When candidates must raise money to run for the bench, elected judges may feel indebted to their contributors, and their decisions may affect the availability of future campaign funds. Furthermore, when the public watches a judge, who benefited from campaign contributions, rule in favor of that donor, trust is eroded regardless of the merits of the decision.  A June 15th New York Times editorial asked “Can Justice Be Bought?” Stricter recusal standards offer only part of the answer. Moving away from judicial elections and instead supporting a system that prioritizes a judge’s ability to analyze the law over his or her ability to raise money provides a more workable solution.

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Nov 19 2008

What They’re Saying in West Virginia

Published by under Judges,News,Opinion

The fact that the United States Supreme Court has decided to hear Caperton v. Massey — the West Virginia case involving campaign contributors and recusal of judges — is of course big news to lawyers and judges.  But it’s also important to members of the public who come to the courts to settle disputes.  Here’s what Hugh Caperton, plaintiff in the case, told The Charleston Gazette about the issue of campaign contributions:

“In this country, money has begun to pervade and permeate every election that’s held. And I agree that it’s the right of each citizen to support their candidate. But you can’t have Supreme Court seats being propped up by millions of dollars from one individual or group,” he said. “It makes the appearance of impropriety so great that normal citizens like myself lose faith in the judicial system.”

Our justice system is based on the public’s trust and confidence that the judges will follow the law and apply it to the facts presented.  When people worry that campaign contributions might influence a judge’s decisions, that confidence is undermined.  We can’t afford that.

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