Feb 23 2009
Is There A Link Between Campaign Contributions and Courtroom Decisions
We know that many, many people are concerned about the influence of campaign contributions on judicial decision-making. But is there really a link or is it all just a question of perception? The National Law Journal is reporting on a new study about the link between campaign contributions and decisions in the courtroom: “Is justice for sale? There is a strong relationship between campaign contributions and decisions by state Supreme Court judges in states that elect those judges, a recent study finds.” The study found the link to be strong in states that elect judges in partisan contests.
The study by political scientists Chris Bonneau of the University of Pittsburgh and Damon Cann of Utah State University looked at three states — Nevada, Texas and Michigan. Michigan and Texas use partisan elections to select judges, and Nevada uses nonpartisan elections. The influence of campaign contributions on decision-making — when other factors such as ideology were controlled for — was stronger in the partisan election states.
This is important information for Pennsylvanians to hear as we enter judicial election season. Remember, we’re one of those states that uses partisan elections. Isn’t it time to get judges out of the fundraising business?
Tags: Chris Bonneau of the University of Pittsburgh, Damon Cann of Utah State University, judicial elections, Michigan, National Law Journal, Nevada, Texas
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Damon and I write to simply clarify two aspects of the study that may not have been clear from the National Law Review’s summary of our work. First, our results remain preliminary because they are based on just a single term of decisions in only 3 states. Second, we actually find no evidence of quid pro quo behavior in the nonpartisan state that we study (Nevada). While our study certainly raises concerns about the possibility of quid pro quo exchanges, we do not yet understand the circumstances under which such exchanges may exist (if they even still appear at all once we have completed our study). As such, our study is not a wholesale indictment of any type of competitive judicial election, but instead is suggestive that some varieties of competitive elections may better avoid the frightening possible problem of quid pro quo between attorneys and judges.
In short, while we think this is an interesting topic of study, and while we have some suggestive preliminary evidence, the “jury is still out” so-to-speak on a final comprehensive answer to this question.